advice for autocrats

[calimac]

I have some advice for autocratic dictators facing a popular uprising. You will be tempted to try to defuse the revolution by offering concessions, allowing some of the reforms which you'd been brushing off from previous, less violent protests by political opponents.

Don't do it. It's too late for that.

Had you allowed some of the reforms back when they were merely being pushed vocally, you might have placated the opposition and remained securely in power, at least for a foreseeable future. But once your people have taken to rioting in the streets and throwing rocks, they're no longer in a mood to be placated. Instead, they will only take your moving now to a compromise position as a sign of your weakness. It will only make them believe - and correctly, too - that the once immovable is now frightened and panicking, and they will push all the harder. Then you'll capitulate more in response, and once you enter that spiral, you're doomed.

Instead, you have a hard choice to make. You need to look honestly at your police strengths and the depths of the rebellion, and decide whether you have the power to crush it, completely.

If you don't, flee - now, while your fearful head is on (to borrow a phrase). Grab all the money and portable valuables you can, and find a country to give you asylum. There you can live out your years in reasonable comfort, as Idi Amin did. Make an honest decision and implement it. If you think you can crush the rebellion but can't, or if you wait too long to go, your fate could be that of Ceauşescu.

If you can crush the rebellion, be ruthless. You're not a dictator for nothing. Squash it utterly and re-establish autocratic law and order. Then, and only then, with a return to the status quo ante, you can afford to learn from your experience and grant mild reforms that will address the protesters' original concerns while still leaving you in power. Then you'll be seen as both strong and flexible, and you can satisfy people's concerns without inducing them to try again to overthrow you.

I doubt any dictators would follow this advice, almost as much as I doubt they'd read this blog in the first place. Nor do I really want them to, of course. But from their perspective, this is what they should do.

Comments

[voidampersand.livejournal.com]

Better advice: Be a statesman. Just because you can crush your opposition doesn't mean you should. They're the future of your country. Cut a deal with them. Live in peace, with more honor than you ever had as dictator.

[kalimac.livejournal.com]

You have to do that before people start rioting. Long before. But anybody minded to be a dictator isn't going to consider cutting deals until they face ruin, and by then it's too late.

[voidampersand.livejournal.com]

It's always possible to exit with more grace than is strictly necessary and less brutality than is possible. There were riots in South Africa. de Klerk could have crushed Mandela but didn't. There were massive demonstrations in East Germany. The security forces did not intervene and the demonstrations stayed peaceful. Honecker and Krenz may not have been able to crush the opposition, but it is better that they didn't try. They still had to face justice, but it was not vindictive. I could go on. There never is a situation where it is too late to exercise restraint. You can always choose not to take everything down with you.

[kalimac.livejournal.com]

It is indeed better than Honecker and Krenz didn't try, since they wouldn't have been able to. They went down, hard, and their attempts to save their regime made them go down harder and faster. Had they tried harder to stay in power - through violence - they would have gone down harder still.

[voidampersand.livejournal.com]

You said that dictators have only two choices: repression, or take the money and run. I'm glad you agree that it was a good thing Honecker and Krenz made a different choice. But I wouldn't say they went down hard. They were treated with scrupulous fairness. And then there's de Klerk, who got a Nobel Peace Prize for his statesmanship, deservedly so.

[kalimac.livejournal.com]

I said they have only those choices if they don't want to risk coming down hard. "Your fate could be that of Ceauşescu," I said, and look at Ceauşescu: his was. Honecker and Krenz were comparably fortunate after their fall, and one reason was that they never really got to the stage of repressive reaction that I'm addressing here. The crowds protested, but didn't riot, and the troops never fired on them. So the German dictators weren't really quite yet caught on the horns of the dilemma I'm describing.

Note what happened, though, as soon as they did make a concession, opening the wall. They intended this as a concession to keep their stability; instead, it led to complete instability and quick collapse. That's why a dictator needs to be repressive if he hopes to keep his job: it's when they try to make deals that they're doomed.

[voidampersand.livejournal.com]

I reject the closing down of the options. I gave examples of repressive leaders that climbed down from the throne and kept their lives, and in some cases did so with great honor. The idea that they're "doomed" depends on what you mean by "doomed". Having to retire, whether you like it or not, is not what I would call "doomed". Nor is getting a Nobel Peace Prize.

[kalimac.livejournal.com]

I'm not talking about all repressive leaders. Read my post: "Had you allowed some of the reforms back when they were merely being pushed vocally, you might have placated the opposition and remained securely in power, at least for a foreseeable future."

[voidampersand.livejournal.com]

Presumably we're talking about Mubarak. Do you really want to advise him that it's too late for negotiation? That his only choices are to loot the treasury and flee, or to suppress his own people with maximum force? Morally I can't imagine that you are seriously advising him to attack his own people. Therefore, you must be advising him to take the money and run. But that's not good for Egypt either. If his opposition has any smarts, which they seem to, they will let him resign without becoming a fugitive. Yes, revolutions are scary and full of uncertainty. It could all turn out very badly. But why encourage dictators to make things even worse?

[kalimac.livejournal.com]

Read my post. "I doubt any dictators would follow this advice ... Nor do I really want them to, of course. But from their perspective, this is what they should do."

[voidampersand.livejournal.com]

I most certainly did read your post. Do not confuse disagreement with incomprehension. You say "from their perspective" but then exclude all the dictators that didn't have that perspective. It's a setup, and I don't accept it. It reminds me rather too much of "The Cold Equations". Why set up an artificially constrained thought experiment that leads only to things you don't want?

[kalimac.livejournal.com]

The perspective is that of the dictators who are "facing a popular uprising ... your people have taken to rioting in the streets and throwing rocks." It says so right in the post, and distinguishes the situation from an earlier state of "when [the reforms] were merely being pushed vocally." I'm not talking about that, because I said I'm not talking about that. The whole post is about states of open rebellion. I didn't suddenly morph in my last paragraph to mean any dictatorship in any state of being. Zwounds!

This is not an artificially constrained thought experiment; it happens all the time. It's the situation in Egypt today. It was the situation in Romania in 1989. It was the situation Louis XVI faced in the French Revolution, and the British in the American revolution. And every other popular uprising/overthrow in history.

The key point is one I've seen noted by serious historians, though I cannot pop up with a reference off the top of my head; this is the outcome of years of reading: that once an open rebellion begins, a previously intransigent regime will offer the reforms that were previously demanded, but it's too late for that: the rebels smell blood and are no longer satisfied. For instance, after the American colonies declared independence, the British offered the exact terms of self-governance that the Continental Congress had been demanding in 1774-5. If it'd been offered then, it'd have been accepted with gratitude. But by the time it was offered, it was too late; the colonists would not withdraw the declaration of independence. And that wasn't even a situation of brutal dictatorship! It was, however, a situation of open rebellion. Similarly, the French Revolution became uncontrollable when the king called a parliament, something the kings had been refusing for over a century. He thought it'd satisfy the rising demands and pacify the people. He was wrong. It only gave them a forum to express themselves even more vehemently. This is a basic dynamic of human politics.

[voidampersand.livejournal.com]

Of course the post is about states of open rebellion. I get that.

What doesn't follow is your recommendation that the dictator consider either crushing the rebellion, or grabbing all the money he can and fleeing into exile. He has other choices. I gave examples from history where there was a state of open rebellion, and the leader didn't crush it and didn't flee.

[kalimac.livejournal.com]

The third choice, which I also noted, is for the regime to be doomed, which is exactly what happened in both your examples. Few dictators, however, will choose that path deliberately once rebellion has gotten to the stage I described, because they risk trial and execution, which has happened on many occasions, and because they don't realize that, once they have reached that stage, stability cannot be achieved through concessions. (It could have earlier, but at that point they didn't feel they needed to do it.)

As to your two examples. East Germany: the regime did try making late-hour concessions in hopes of pacifying the rebellion, and - exactly as I described - it didn't work. It led directly to the regime's collapse. This was neither the regime's intent nor its expectation. Fortunately for the dictators' personal hides, their fate was less extreme than that of other fallen dictators. I see at least two reasons for that. One was that the concession - the opening of the wall - was offered at a relatively early stage in the spiral. Had the regime fired on the protesters, had the crackdown on the escapees over the previous summer been more brutal, I think things would have gone much worse. The second reason is that when the regime collapsed, it was promptly absorbed by the stable FRG. This is unusual; in such cases, there is rarely such an exterior government both available and popularly desired.

South Africa. I'm not as familiar with the details here, but I think they followed my other path of advice: "Had you allowed some of the reforms back when they were merely being pushed vocally, you might have placated the opposition and remained securely in power, at least for a foreseeable future." Although you wouldn't have known it from the rhetoric being used by anti-apartheid protesters in the US, the regime had been in the process of ameliorating and dismantling apartheid for over a decade before the regime changed. De Klerk got his well-deserved Nobel because he did what dictators really should do: he defused the rebellion by offering concessions when they were still timely, as opposed to trying to stand pat until it was too late.

[voidampersand.livejournal.com]

You describe the regime being doomed as if that's a bad thing. And in your second choice, where the dictator grabs whatever money and valuables are available and flees, the regime is just as doomed. This is about what a dictator should do when his regime is doomed. You keep saying the only choices are either violence or theft.

There is common flaw in your reasoning, the assumption, without justification, that a dictator must always try to remain in power. Just because a leader is repressive doesn't mean his motivations are simplistic, or that he is lacking in patriotism. They can be negotiated with, and they can choose to do what is right for their country, as long as they are not backed into a corner and it becomes a question of their own personal survival.

In picking apart my critique, you keep missing the point. The East German regime made choices other than the only two that you acknowledge. Those choices resulted in the regime falling peacefully, and without the treasury being looted by fleeing officials. That was a good thing. De Klerk did not, as you say, placate the opposition and remain in power. He lost power, as did his party. The concessions he made were to secure a peaceful transition and avoid civil war. That was a good thing. Had he remained within the constraints of your analysis, things would have been much worse.

[kalimac.livejournal.com]

Being doomed is a bad thing for the person who is doomed. I chose to write the post addressing their perspective, because I thought it would be an interesting way of viewing the problem.

"as long as they are not backed into a corner" - my point is that after rebellion has reached a certain stage, they are backed into a corner.

I am not missing your point, I am disagreeing with it. I suggest that you apply to yourself your own strictures about understanding what's being written. The two choices I described were the choices of how to save the regime (or at least try) or how to escape its downfall. However, a third course of action was also clearly stated, which was to stay and take your lumps. This can be risky. "Your fate could be that of Ceauşescu," I said. That doesn't mean it has to be, but that's a mighty high price to risk.

Now, what happened in East Germany? The regime made the mistake (from its perspective) of trying to save itself by concessions, and then it inevitably fell. What happened then? Krentz went to prison. That's a pretty degrading thing for a former leader of his country. I'd call that pretty well being doomed. And Honecker ... he followed my advice to dictators and fled the country to avoid the same fate. I don't know how much money he took with him, but that's not really relevant.

In South Africa, on the contrary: de Klerk did placate the opposition and remain in power. He and Botha, who preceded him, remained in power for over ten years after they began dismantling apartheid. Then de Klerk peacefully handed over the presidency to Mandela and became his Deputy President. So even then he was, in a sense, still in power.

De Klerk is not a case subject to my analysis because he took the high road before he reached the situation to which my analysis refers. I discussed that high road in the post. I said "it's too late for that now," referring to cases in which it was too late. His wasn't.

[kalimac.livejournal.com]

You asked, "why encourage dictators to make things even worse?" My answer was in my post: "Nor do I really want them to, of course." The whole idea of advising dictators how to be more brutal was something of a Swiftian "modest proposal."

If you really do merely disagree with my analysis, rather than trying to put across a veneer of incomprehension, why ask such a question to which the answer is right there in glowing phosphors?

[voidampersand.livejournal.com]

If this was meant as a Swiftean "modest proposal", you forgot the satirical part.

I asked the question "why encourage dictators to make things even worse?" because I felt that it was not answered. Your response that of course you have answered it already is unsatisfactory. So I ask again. Why tell the dictator that he has only two choices, neither of which you really want him to take, and ignore other perfectly valid choices and examples from history that are better?

[kalimac.livejournal.com]

Swift was accused of leaving out the satire, too. A lot of readers took him seriously, and were shocked.

Did you really think I was encouraging dictators? I thought my "I don't really want them to, of course," was sufficient inoculation against such an absurd reading.

The question you ask here is not the same question as the one you asked before, though its thrust is the same. The previous question did not take into consideration what I actually wrote. This one does. Answer is in my concurrent reply.

[voidampersand.livejournal.com]

If you are writing satire, who is it aimed at? Who is being punctured? With Swift, you could tell. And where is the creative exaggeration of common foibles? When Swift wrote satire, he turned it up to 11.

I don't think you're encouraging dictators. It's not like Mubarak is reading your LJ for advice. And it's not like your writing causes dictators to pop up around the world. The question is more how we should think about dictators and what choices are available to them. My critique is that there are far better choices than the ones you presented and keep hammering on.

[scribblerworks.livejournal.com]

I don't think calimac's commentary is at all about how we should think about dictators and what choices are available to them. My reading of his original post is that he was posing a hypothetical to the dictitorially minded as to what the options were when faced with open rebellion.

I do NOT think he was putting forward options that were intended to be "right minded options". I think he was putting forward the options a dictator would see before himself.

Keeping in mind that above all, a dictator wants to (1) keep the power he has and (2) stay alive. A dictator is not likely to be concerned about the best option for his people or his nation. Otherwise, he would not be a dictator or autocrat - he would be a ruler who pays attention to those he is supposed to serve (consider how King Juan Carlos conducts himself - he is in fact a political power, not a merely ceremonial monarch, and he keeps his power by paying attention and addressing concerns).

But calimac's observations about the necessity of brutality for holding onto power in the face of open rebellion is also demonstrated in modern life. Consider how the Chinese Power Structure handled the open rebellion of Tienamien Square. I would not call running tanks over protestors to be an act of accomodation. Or, the "government" of Burma/Myanmar - brutal suppression has kept them in power in the face of sporatic uprisings.

[voidampersand.livejournal.com]

Except there were dictators who saw other choices. If it's a thought experiment, it's in how a dictator might see things, but with participation arbitrarily limited to dictators who see things only in certain ways, and have only certain motivations. I'm not denying any of the historical examples that calimac has brought up, or yours. He's a smart guy and knows his history extremely well. I'm only questioning the exclusion of other examples that show alternatives to the stark choice of either repression or theft. Yes, repressive leaders and governments do bad things. It's part of being repressive. But sometimes they stop, peacefully. To me that's far more interesting and useful to understand than the regular cycle of selfishness, ambition, repression, and fear.

[kalimac.livejournal.com]

It is interesting. But it's a different situation. What interests me is how dictators who ought to see your solutions fail to do so until it's too late and there's no happy way out.

What inspired me to write the post was Mubarak's announcement of - after 30 years without one - the appointment of a VP. That was a concession. He should have made that ages ago, and prepared to retire peacefully, as de Klerk did. But he didn't. That he does it now, in the middle of rioting in the streets, told me, "He's doomed." Unless he can suppress the rebellion with the brutality of Tiananmen Square, Egypt will have a new regime very soon.

It'd be nice to avoid getting into morasses like this, I agree. Part of learning to avoid them is studying what happens when you do get into them. In this particular post, I'm studying that part. At other times and places, we can study other parts.

[voidampersand.livejournal.com]

Maybe Mubarak thought he could keep the lid on for his whole life. He's 82 years old. Did he even think he would live this long? Maybe he thought that granting concessions earlier would only embolden the opposition. There isn't any way to know. I don't even know if his belated and half-hearted attempts to grant concessions now are ineffective. Certainly their not going to keep in power. Nothing is going to do that. But they could be part of an effective negotiating strategy. That's interesting. And it's not a different situation. It's what's happening right now.

[scribblerworks.livejournal.com]

So, basically, your comments boil down to "But some dictators and autocrats when faced with rebellion choose to stop being dictators and autocrats." That is, they give up the "my way or no way" mindset.

Well, yeah. That does happen.

At which point, they take themselves out of the category of "dictator and autocrat."

But Idi Amin in exile was still a dictator. The Shah of Iran in exile was still an autocrat. Being out of the job, of itself, does not remove them from the category of "dictator and autocrat." Only, as you say, "choosing other options."

But calimac had restricted his comments to the specific category - probably because at this particular moment, he was not interested in a wider discussion. At this moment.

[voidampersand.livejournal.com]

Why, at this moment, should we only talk about dictators who are not allowed to negotiate, given that the dictator of Egypt is negotiating right now. Who is this about, if not him? And who is not going to allow him to negotiate? The Army? They called him to negotiations.

[steepholm.livejournal.com]

Interesting post - and I pretty much agree with all of it. Only, I'd say it was more in the spirit of The Prince than "A Modest Proposal".